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A MATTER OF TRUST: IMPOSING EMPLOYER
VICARIOUS LIABILITY FOR THE INTENTIONAL
TORTS OF EMPLOYEES
Shana L. Malinowski
On June 2, 1988, Antoinette Sebastian was injured in an automobile collision in
the District of Columbia ("District"). A District ambulance arrived promptly to

transport her to District of Columbia General Hospital ("D.C. General"). Ms.
Sebastian alleged that, while en route to the hospital, District ambulance
attendant David Joy sexually molested her when she was strapped to the

ambulance backboard. 1 Ms. Sebastian subsequently lodged a complaint with D.C.
2
General, an agency of the District. No action was taken.
Approximately six months later, Ms. Gloria Crayton was experiencing difficulty
breathing and called an ambulance. Again, David Joy was the ambulance
attendant; again, Mr. Joy allegedly sexually assaulted his patient.3 Both Ms.

Sebastian and Ms. Crayton brought separate actions against the District alleging,
4
inter alia, sexual assault. The trial court consolidated the cases.
Ms. Sebastian brought a lawsuit against the District for damages resulting from
the sexual assault, alleging the District should be liable under a theory of
respondeat superior. However, because she failed to file within the appropriate
statute of limitations," the trial court barred four of Ms. Sebastian's seven counts.6
Ms. Sebastian also alleged two other causes of action: breach of implied contract
of safe carriage, and breach of non-delegable duty to provide safe carriage. The
trial court dismissed these two counts as non-actionable pursuant to the public

duty doctrine.7 The sole remaining count for the jury's consideration was the tort
1. Brief for Appellant at 1,Sebastian v. District of Columbia. 636 A.2d 958 (D.C. 1994) (No. 92-551).
2. Antoinette Sebastian v. District of Columbia, No. 90-14832 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1990).
3. Gloria Crayton v. District of Columbia, No. 89-12233 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1989).
4. Appellant's Brief at 1, Sebastian (No. 92-551).
5. The District of Columbia provides a one year limitation for certain causes of action: -libel, slander.
assault, battery, mayhem, wounding, malicious prosecution, false arrest or false imprisonment." D.C CosE
ANN.§ 12-301(4) (1989).
6.
Sebastian v. District of Columbia, 636 A.2d 958, 959 & n.l (D.C. 1994). The trial court dismissed
Counts II through V on statute of limitations grounds. These counts, alleging liability for the District of
Columbia under a theory of respondeat superior, were: Count II: assault and battery: Count Ill: intentional
infliction of emotional distress; Count IV: negligence; and Count V: negligent infliction of emotional distress.
7. Sebastian, 636 A.2d at 959. Generally, under the public duty doctrine, "a government and its agents
owe no duty to provide public services to particular citizens as individuals. Instead, absent some 'special
relationship' between the government and the individual, the District's duty is to provide public services to the
public at large." Hines v. District of Columbia, 580 A.2d 133, 136 (D.C. 1990). The public duty doctrine
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of negligent hiring, training, supervision and duty assignment. After deliberating,
the jury found the District was not negligent in the hiring, training and duty
assignment of Joy with regard to Ms. Sebastian's assault; 8 but it did find that the
District was negligent in subsequently failing to act despite its previous knowledge
of Mr. Joy's sexual misconduct with Ms. Sebastian, and found in favor of Ms.
Crayton.9
This Note will first briefly describe the procedural history of Ms. Sebastian's
case, explaining why the court barred her recovery at the appellate level.
Arguably, even if Ms. Sebastian had filed her respondeat superior claims within
the statute of limitations, she may still have been precluded from recovering.
Under current District law, Mr. Joy's actions would probably be construed as an
intentional tort falling outside current "scope of employment law," successfully
shielding the District from vicarious liability for Mr. Joy's actions. This Note will
analyze traditional theories of vicarious liability, focusing specifically on scope of
employment, followed by a comparison of the current scope of employment
standards in the District of Columbia with trends in other jurisdictions. Finally, a
new standard is proposed which would broaden the scope of employment liability
protection to include such plaintiffs as Ms. Sebastian, as well as other intentional
tort victims who because of age, or physical or mental ability, entrust their care to

protects both the District and its employees from incurring liability in the course of their duties of providing
services to the public by not subjecting these parties to certain civil claims. Id.
The one exception to the public duty doctrine is the "special duty" exception. The elements of this
exception are: "(1) a specific undertaking by a government agent to provide help or protection to a specific
individual or group, and (2) that individual's resulting particularized and justifiable reliance." Id. at 138
(citing Morgan v. District of Columbia, 468 A.2d 1306, 1313-14 (D.C. 1983)).
Ms. Sebastian argued on appeal that the public duty doctrine did not bar her claim because she had a
"special relationship" resulting from her status as an injured passenger in the ambulance relying on a service.
Appellant's Brief at 4, Sebastian (No. 92-551). She noted that the court had never employed the public duty
doctrine to bar a claim when the employee of the municipality "actively and directly caused the plaintiff
harm." Id. at 7 (citing Powell v. District of Columbia, 602 A.2d 1123, 1135 (D.C. 1992)). The District did
not respond to this contention in its brief. Instead, the District argued that it should not be held liable in
general under the theory of respondeat superior because it considered David Joy's conduct to be outside the
scope of his employment. The District also contended that all the vicarious liability claims for assault and
battery were barred by the statute of limitations and that it was inappropriate to expand the theory of
respondeat superior to include intentional torts committed by employees outside the scope of employment,
Brief for Appellee at 5, 14, Sebastian v. District of Columbia, 636 A.2d 958 (D.C. 1994) (No. 92-551).
The court of appeals did not address the merits of the trial court's ruling that the public duty doctrine
barred Ms. Sebastian's claims. Rather, the court affirmed the trial court's decision on grounds other than
those on which the trial court relied or which were raised below. Sebastian, 636 A.2d at 959 n.2.
8. Appellee's Brief at 3, Sebastian (No. 92-551).
9. Appellant's Brief at 2, Sebastian (No. 92-551).
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an employee of a service provider and are intentionally harmed by that trusted
employee.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Ms. Sebastian did not appeal the jury verdict in favor of the District or the trial
court's dismissal of those counts barred by the statute of limitations.10 Rather, Ms.

Sebastian asserted on appeal a theory of "'breach of non-delegable duty of
protective care.'

"I'

Ms. Sebastian argued that the District should be held

vicariously liable for the acts of an employee which the District claimed were
committed outside the scope of employment.
Ms. Sebastian's appeal focused on whether the court should extend and expand

vicarious liability employing two possible theories: (1) an ambulance, as a common
carrier, is subject to a broader scope of liability than are others;1 2 or (2) a special
relationship was created "between the ambulance service and an ambulance
passenger, who surrenders control over his or her safety, which imposes a special

duty upon the ambulance service to protect the passenger from harm whatever the

10. Sebastian, 636 A.2d at 959.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 961. Ms. Sebastian asserted that the District was a common carrier and as such should bI
liable for Mr. Joy's act. Generally, common carriers are held to a heightened standard of care and thus are
burdened with greater liability for injuries or losses. See, e.g.. Hunt v. Clifford. 209 A.2d 182 (Conn. 1965);
Crapo v. Rockwell, 94 N.Y.S. 1122 (1905). Common carrier liability is an exception to the doctrine of
respondeat superior because it imposes strict liability on the carrier for harm to the person or property
entrusted to the carrier, without a requirement that the plaintiff demonstrate the carrier was actually at fault.
Ms. Sebastian argued that assaults committed by employees fall within the purview of common carrier
liability and that the District, as an operator of a common carrier, should be held strictly liable. AppeIllant's
Reply Brief at 6, Sebastian (No. 92-551). Ms. Sebastian reasoned that there is an implied contract created
between the patient and the provider of the ambulance service. Moreover, she contended public policy requires
the use of the safest possible care in transporting passengers. She concluded that a special duty is created
when a passenger entrusts his or her well-being to the carrier. Id. (citing Rabon v. Guardsmark, 571 F.2d
1277, 1281 n.5 (4th Cir. 1978)).
The court of appeals noted that the District does not recognize the common carrier doctrine and stated
that the required standard of care is reasonable care. Sebastian. 636 A.2d at 962 (citing McKethean v.
Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 588 A.2d 708. 712 (D.C. 1991); District of Columbia Transit Sys..
Inc. v. Carney, 254 A.2d 402, 403 (D.C. 1969); Missile Cob Ass'n v. Rogers, 184 A.2d 845. 847 (D.C. 1962);
Bray v. District of Columbia Transit Sys., Inc., 179 A.2d 387, 388-89 (D.C. 1962); District of Columbia
Transit Sys., Inc. v. Smith, 173 A.2d 216, 217 (D.C. 1961); Lindsey v. District of Columbia Transit Co.. 140
A.2d 306, 309 (D.C. 1958)). Therefore, the standard for imposing liability would not change. even if the
ambulance was a common carrier.
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source."13 The court held that because the District did not recognize the increased
liability some jurisdictions impose through the common carrier doctrine and
instead carved the requisite standard in terms of reasonable care, the city was not
vicariously liable for Ms. Sebastian's injuries.1 ' In affirming the trial court's
13. Sebastian, 636 A.2d at 961. Ms. Sebastian proposed that the court adopt the following special
relationship test as an expansion of the doctrine of respondeat superior:
Where an employer has a duty of care to provide protection to a person who is impaired and
dependent, generated by the impaired person's surrender of control over his or her own safety to the
employer, then the employer would be liable for willful torts inflicted on that person by an employee.
Id. at 963 n.8.
Ms. Sebastian also relied on § 214 of the Second Restatement of Agency. That section provides:
A master or other principal who is under a duty to provide protection for or to have care used to
protect others or their property and who confides the performance of such duty to a servant or other
person is subject to liability to such others for harm caused to them by the failure of such agent to
perform the duty.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 214 (1957). Ms. Sebastian argued that under the facts of her case she
had a special relationship with the District that gave rise to a non-delegable duty. Moreover, relying on
comment (a) to Section 214, she contended that a principal could be held liable for torts of employees
committed outside the scope of employment by entering into a contract or a special relationship with a person.
Appellant's Reply Brief at 7, Sebastian (No. 92-551) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 214 cmt.

a (1957)).
The District argued that Section 214 was too broad in that it did not specify nor did it limit the situations
where a special duty can exist. Appellee's Brief at 26, Sebastian (No. 92-551). The District contended that
adopting Ms. Sebastian's proposed rule would greatly expand the scope of vicarious liability and would
effectively override the limits of respondeat superior in many cases. Id. at 27. The District asserted that using
the Restatement § 214 approach would drastically increase employer liability. Id.
The court of appeals accepted the District's argument, drawing support from its prior decisions. In Lacy
v. District of Columbia, 424 A.2d 317 (D.C. 1980), a case involving the sexual assault of a school child by the
school janitor, the court upheld a jury instruction that stated "the District could only be liable if plaintiffs had
shown that the District 'had knowledge or should have had knowledge of the likelihood that [the child] would
be assaulted' while at school." Sebastian, 636 A.2d at 966 (quoting Lacy, 424 A.2d at 322). The court also
emphasized that the cases which Ms. Sebastian cited to support the adoption of Restatement § 214 relied on
the common carrier doctrine as their basis for a higher duty. The court specifically cited Ms. Sebastian's
reliance on Stropes v. Heritage House Childrens Ctr., 547 N.E.2d 244 (Ind. 1989). The court quoted Stropes
stating:
The court held that " [a]n examination of the relevant relationship here against the template of the
common carrierexception and the rationales underlying it reveals that [the children's center] clearly
assumed a non-delegable duty to be responsible for the care and safety of [the child]." Id. at 263
(emphasis added). Stropes provides no support for imposing liability against the District in this case
because the Stropes court relied on the common carrier doctrine as the foundation for its holding of
liability based on the special relationship between the childrens center and the victim.
Id. at 964. The court noted that the District of Columbia does not recognize the traditional common carrier
doctrine which imposes greater liability on common carriers. Sebastian, 636 A.2d at 962-63. Additionally, the
court refused to hold "that ambulance services implicitly contract to ensure the safe transport of their
passengers against every kind of injury." Id. at 963.
14. Sebastian, 636 A.2d at 962-63.

VICARIOUS LIABILITY

decision, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals reasoned that it was the
province of the legislature and not the judiciary to expand respondeat superior
liability and, accordingly, declined to hold the District liable.'0

II.

VICARIOUS LABIITY

Under the doctrine of vicarious liability, a defendant can be held liable for the
acts of another even though she was not personally at fault. Vicarious liability is a
type of "no fault" liability,16n which arises most often in conjunction with the
doctrine of respondeat superior, or "let the master answer."'1 A master is liable for
the torts that the servant commits when acting within the scope of his or her
employment."" The important factor in distinguishing whether an employee is a
servant, as opposed to an independent contractor, is whether the employer
exercises a sufficient amount of control over the servant to justify the imposition of
liability.' 9 Because employers exercise less control over independent contractors,
15. Id. at 966.
16. Fleming James, Jr., Vicarious Liability, 28 TUL L REv. 161. 166-67 (1954). There is some debate
over the origins of the doctrine. Id. at 164. Professor Wigmore believed its roots were Germanic. he traced the
doctrine back to the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. See John H. Wigmore, Responsibiltyfor Tortious Acts:
Its History, 7 HARV. L. REv. 315, 330, 336-37 (1894). Justice Holmes, a staunch critic of the doctrine,
believed its birth was in Roman law. See Oliver W. Holmes, Agency. 5 HARv L REv 1.14 (1891) ("1
assume that common sense is opposed to making one pay for another man's wrong, unless he actually has
brought the wrong to pass accordingly to the ordinary cannons of legal responsibility.") See also OuvEa W.
HoumEs, THE COMMON LAW, LECTURE ONE (1881) (discussing the Roman law history of vicarious liability).
Despite the less than certain background, vicarious liability has stood the test of time and is still applied today.
17. "Master" and "servant" are the traditional terms often used interchangeably today with the terms
"employer" and "employee."
18. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND') oF AGENCY § 219(1) (1957).
19. Id. § 220(1). Section 220(2) enumerates factors to consider in determining whether an employee is a
servant:
(a) the extent of control which, by the agreement, the master may exercise over the details of the
work;
(b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct occupation or business;
(c) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the locality, the work is usually done under
the direction of the employer or by a specialist without supervision;
(d) the skill required in the particular occupation;
(e) whether the employer or the workman supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work
for the person doing the work
(f)the length of time for which the person is employed;
(g) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job;
(h) whether or not the work is a part of the regular business of the employer,
(i) whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relation of master and servant; and
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employer liability for the torts of contractors is significantly less than employer
liability for the acts of servants.20 Conduct considered to be within the scope of
employment is that which is authorized or similar to regularly authorized
conduct.21 Unauthorized conduct, however, can also fall within the scope of
employment under certain circumstances.2 2 A master may be liable even if the
servant's act is specifically forbidden.22 Furthermore, a master is not free from
liability merely because such an act is consciously criminal or tortious. 2' When
determining whether the conduct of an employee was within the scope of
employment, courts generally look to see whether the servant had engaged in the
25
activities to serve the interest of the master, or was on a "frolic.1

There are various theories justifying no-fault liability. The traditional
justification is that the master controls, or at least has the right to control, the

(j) whether or not the principal is or is not in business.
Id.
20. Id. § 250. This section states:
A principal is not liable for physical harm caused by the negligent physical conduct of a non-servant
agent during the performance of the principal's business, if he neither intended nor authorized the
result nor the manner of performance, unless he was under a duty to have the act performed with
due care.
Id.
21. Id. § 229.
22. Id. The factors to consider under § 229(2) when determining what particular conduct falls within
the scope of employment are:
(a) whether or not the act is one commonly done by such servants;
(b) the time, place and purpose of the act;
(c) the previous relations between the master and the servant;
(d) the extent to which the business of the master is apportioned between different servants;
(e) whether or not the act is outside the enterprise of the master or, if within the enterprise, has not
been entrusted to any servant;
(f) whether or not the master has reason to expect that such an act will be done;
(g) the similarity in quality of the act done to the act authorized;
(h) whether or not the instrumentality by which the harm is done has been furnished by the master
to the servant;
(i) the extent of departure from the normal method of accomplishing an authorized result; and
(j) whether or not the act is seriously criminal.
Id.
23. Id. § 230.
24. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 231 (1957).
25. See generally Young B. Smith, Frolic and Detour, 23 COLUM. L. REV. 444 (1923). See also Alan
Q. Sykes, The Boundaries of Vicarious Liability: An Economic Analysis of the Scope of Employment Rule
and Related Legal Doctrines, 101 HARV. L. REV. 563, 583 (1988) (describing "frolic" as the situation where
"an employee, while on a travel for the employer, deviates from his assigned tasks for personal errands or
other personal business").
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servant. 26 This justification, however, is not completely satisfactory because an
employer rarely has complete control over employees; moreover, the master can
still be held liable for acts he has expressly forbidden. Another theory, the socalled "entrepreneur theory,""7 holds that a person injured through no fault of his
own by the servant of an otherwise blameless master ought to recover from the
employer whose enterprise set into motion the force that injured the plaintiff.
Commentators offer two rationales in support of this theory. First, because the
master usually benefits financially from the work of the servant, he therefore
should bear the cost of accidents as well. 8 Second, the master should bear the
costs because it is usually easier for the enterprise to obtain liability insurance for
accidents occurring in the course of business."'
Another justification for respondeat superior is that because the master selected
and hired the servant, she should be responsible for the servant's actions.30
Imposing liability is desirable because it encourages the master to use the highest
care which is reasonable when selecting and hiring the servant.sl Some
commentators support vicarious liability simply because the master generally has
"deeper pockets" 32 than the victim or the employee, or at least may be able to
spread the cost to all the consumers of the master's service or product a

m11'.
STANDARDS
A.

OF SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT

Foreseeability and the California Approach

While all courts restrict the liability of a master to acts committed within the
servant's "scope of employment," the courts have not been consistent in defining
the phrase.34 The California Supreme Court, for example, has interpreted the

26. W. PAGE KEETON ET A., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF ToRTs. 501 (5th ed. 1984).
27. See generally Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70
YALE LJ.499 (1961).
28. See William 0. Douglas, Vicarious Liability and Admnistration of Risk. 1,38 YALE LJ 584. 586
(1928-29).
29. See James, supra note 16, at 163.
30. See Rochelle Rubin Weber, "Scope of Employment" Redefined: Holding Employers Vicariously
Liable for Sexual Assaults Committed by Their Employees, 76 Miss L REv 1513. 1519 (1992).
31. Id. at 1533.
32. See Calabresi, supra note 27, at 527-28.
33. See, e.g., THOMAS BATY. VICARIOus LIABLTY 154 (1916).
34. Scholars have also struggled with the definition. See. e.g.. PROSSER. TORTS § 70 (4th ed. 1971);
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phrase quite broadly. In one example, the court imposed vicarious liability in a
case where the defendant's truck driver became involved in a fight with a plaintiff
who claimed the truck "crowded him" off the road and caused him to hit the
curb.35 The plaintiff signaled the truck to pull over, the truck driver complied, and
the fight ensued.36 The court held:
In considering whether an unauthorized wrongful act of an agent is
attributable to his principal, we cannot look to the nature of such act alone to
see whether it was committed in and as part of the transaction of the
principal's business, but we must consider as well the activity of the agent on
behalf of the principal in connection with which the act was committed. The
inquiry is not whether the wrongful act itself was authorized but whether it
was committed in the course of a series of acts of the agent which were
authorized by the principal.7
As its rationale for imposing liability, the court stated that the "defendant's
enterprise required an association of employees with third parties, attended by the
risk that someone might be injured." 38 The California courts have also found an
This highly indefinite phrase which sometimes is varied with "in the course of the employment," is so
devoid of meaning in itself that its very vagueness has been of value in permitting a desirable degree
of flexibility in decisions. It is obviously no more than a bare formula to cover the unordered and
unauthorized acts of the servant for which it is found to be expedient to charge the master with
liability, as well as to exclude other acts for which it is not. It refers to those acts which are so closely
connected with what the servant is employed to do, and so fairly reasonably incidental to it, that they
may be regarded as methods, even though quite improper ones, of carrying out the objectives of the
employment.
Id. at 460-61.
35. Fields v. Sanders, 180 P.2d 684, 686 (Cal. 1947) (en banc) (Traynor, J.).
36. Id. at 687.
37. Id. at 688 (emphasis added).
38. Id. at 689 (quoting Carr v. Win. C. Crowell Co., 171 P.2d 5, 7 (Cal. 1946) (en banc) (holding
master liable in a situation where building contractor threw a hammer at a workman in the course of a dispute
on the job)). The imposition of vicarious liability for job-related disputes is not unusual throughout the
jurisdictions. The theory has been that work related controversies are a natural outgrowth of the job. As
Justice Rutledge stated :
Men do not discard their personal qualities when they go to work. Into the job they carry their
intelligence, skill, habits of care and rectitude. Just as inevitably they take along also their tendencies
to carelessness and comraderie, as well as emotional make- up. In bringing men together, work
brings these qualities together, causes frictions between them, creates occasions for lapses into
carelessness, and for fun-making and emotional flare-up.... These expressions of human nature arc
incidents inseparable from working together. They involve risks of injury and these risks are inherent
in the working environment.
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employer vicariously liable for an automobile accident that occurred while its
employee was driving to work in his personal car, 0 and for sexual assaults on
female citizens by police officers. 4 0 The California courts' approach is situational.
The motivation to serve the employer is examined, but surrounding facts and
circumstances are also heavily weighed.
California's approach involves the use of foreseeability as a test for imposing
liability. For instance, in a case involving the sexual assault of a woman by a police
officer, the California Supreme Court looked to the authority of police officers and
stated, "[fi]n view of the considerable power... police officers possess, it is neither
startling nor unexpected that on occasion an officer will misuse that authority by
engaging in assaultive conduct."4 1 Because the court believed this type of conduct,
although rare, was foreseeable as a natural outgrowth of the position in society
that police officers hold, the court held the City liable for the sexual assault.42 The
California courts appear to apply foreseeability as an objective standard, i.e.,
whether a reasonable person would fear that a police officer could use the
substantial power the officer has to sexually assault a citizen.
The California Supreme Court, however, appears to be struggling with the
boundaries of the foreseeability test. For example, the court refused to find
vicarious liability under this same job-created authority standard in cases involving
sexual assaults by teachers on students, although teachers are authority figures in
the eyes of students and the act is foreseeable.' 3 In the case of Kimberly M. v. Los
Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Cardillo, 112 F.2d 11, 15 (D.C. Cir.). cert. denied, 310 US. 649
(1940). See also Leonbruno v. Champlain Silk Mills. 128 N.E. 711 (N.Y. 1920) (Cardozo. J.). Because the
employer brings workers together and benefits from their work, the employer has also been held liable for
injuries arising out of the "risk" of the compilation of workers.
39. Hinman v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 471 P.2d 988 (Cal. 1970) (en banc). Defendant's emplo)ce was
paid time and travel expenses for his trips to and from home and the job site. The court reasoned that if the
employer was to gain from reaching out to a larger labor market by encouraging travel through compensation
for time and expense, the employer should also bear the risk of injuries in transportation. See also Rhett B.
Franklin, Comment, PouringNew Wine into an Old Bottle: A Recommendationfor Determining Liability of
an Employer under Respondeat Superior, 39 S.D. L REV. 570 (1994) (analyzing the -going and coming" rule
for imposing liability on employers for torts committed by employees while traveling to and from work).
40. White v. County of Orange, 212 Cal. Rptr. 493 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985); and Mary N1.v. City of Los
Angeles, 814 P.2d 1341 (Cal. 1991) (en banc). See also Christopher B. Krueger, Note, Mary M. v. City of
Los Angeles: Should a City Be Held Liable under Respondeat Superiorfor a Rape by a Police Officer?. 28
US.F. L REV. 419 (1994).
41. Mary M., 814 P.2d at 1350.
42. Id.
43. See John R. v. Oakland Unified Sch. DisL, 769 P.2d 948 (Cal. 1989) (en bane). The court found in
favor of the defendant school district on a claim of sexual assault committed by a male teacher against a 14
year-old male student at the teacher's home. The teacher encouraged the student to come to his house to
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Angeles Unified Sch. Dist., 4 the court found the defendant school district not
liable under respondeat superior for the sexual assault of a five year-old female
student on school premises by a female teacher. Although the authority a teacher
has over a five year-old is much greater than over a teenager,"4 the court found it
4
"too attenuated" to impose liability. "
The concurring opinion in Kimberly M. urged the California Supreme Court to
reconsider its opinion in John R.,47 stating that it was too broad in that it stated in
essence that school districts should not be held liable for the sexual assaults of
teachers for policy reasons.4 8 Additionally, Judge Johnson argued in the concurring
opinion that liability under the job-created authority standard would be properly
imposed because the greater authority a teacher possesses over a five year-old is
"at least as equal to the authority the deputy sheriff exerted over the victim in

White."49
A reasonable person would foresee that, given the opportunity, some teachers
will abuse the power they have to sexually assault students.50 Although the
California courts appear to apply foreseeability, it has been applied inconsistently
in the teacher and police officer sexual assault cases, where the court's reasoning
was based on the power and control the aggressor exercised over the victim.
Because this type of inconsistency exists, foreseeability is not always an
appropriate test.

participate in a teacher's assistant program authorized by the school district. The teacher threatened to fall
the student if he did not have sex with him. The court found, however, that the authority the teacher had over
the student was not significant enough to impose the job-created authority standard. Id. at 955.
44. 263 Cal. Rptr. 612 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989). Kimberly M. had been transferred from the California
Supreme Court to the appellate court with instructions to the court to "vacate ... [its former opinion which
found the school district liable] and to reconsider in light of John R." Id. at 613 (internal citations omitted).
45. See John R., 769 P.2d at 948 and supra note 43.
46. Kimberly M., 263 Cal. Rptr. at 614.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 615.
49. Id. (citing White v. County of Orange, 212 Cal. Rptr. 493 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (holding county
liable under the job-created authority standard for rape by sheriff)).
50. Indeed, the sexual assault of students by teachers happens quite often. See, e.g.. Virginia G. v. ABC
Unified Sch. Dist., 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 671 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993), Horace Mann Ins. Co. v. Barbara B., 4 Cal.
Rptr. 2d (Cal. Ct. App. 1992), Meiers-Post v. Schafer, 427 N.W.2d 606 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988), S.M. v. R.B.,
862 P.2d 1166 (Mont. 1993), Shante D. v. City of New York, 598 N.Y.S.2d 475 (N.Y. App, Div. 1993),
Medlin v. Bass, 398 S.E.2d 460 (N.C. 1990), Scott v. Willis, 543 A.2d 165 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988), State v.
Goodreau, 560 A.2d 318 (R.I. 1989), Scadden v. State, 732 P.2d 1036 (Wyo. 1987).
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B. Foreseeabilityand the District of Columbia Approach
In contrast to the California approach, the District of Columbia and other
jurisdictions have adopted the Restatement approach and applied it to scope of
employment analysis.5 1 These jurisdictions look to the Second Restatement of
Agency Section 228 which sets the boundaries for scope of employment. This
section states:
(1) Conduct of a servant is within the scope of employment if, but only if:
(a) it is of the kind he is employed to perform;
(b) it occurs substantially within the authorized time and space limits;
(c) it is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the master; and
(d) if force is intentionally used by the servant against another; the use
of force is not unexpectable by the master.
(2) Conduct of a servant is not within the scope of employment if it is
different in kind from that authorized, far beyond the authorized time or
space limits, or too little actuated by a purpose to serve the master."'
The Restatement approach has led the District to adopt a much narrower
definition of scope of employment than California. In determining whether conduct
is within the scope of employment, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
considers an important factor to be whether the conduct was "within the range of
responsibilities entrusted to the employee." 5 3 Applying this definition, the court has
limited scope of employment to those specific acts for which the master employed
the servant to perform and those that are foreseeably included in the servant's
duties, i.e., necessary to perform the servant's tasks.' This definition would not
include sexual assaults which are construed to be personal in nature. Further, it is
illegal in the District of Columbia to hire someone to perform a sexual act even if
it was consensual. Employers do not derive any type of benefit from an employee's
sexual assault.

51. See, e.g.. Johnson v. Weinberg, 434 A.2d 404 (D.C. 1981); Commercial Union Ins. Co. v,Bur
Thomas-Aitken Constr. Co., 230 A.2d 498 (N.J. 1967); Olson v. Connerly. 457 N.W.2d 479 (Wis. 1990)
52. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228 (1957)
53. Howard University v. Best, 484 A.2d 958, 987 (D.C. 1984) (citing Johnson v. Wienbtrg. 434 A.2d
404, 408 (D.C. 1981)).
54. Id. (holding that it was a question for the jury to determine whether the assault arose out of and
was committed in the course of employment).
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IV.

A.

ANALYSIS AND PROPOSAL OF A NEw STANDARD

Scope of Employment and Sexual Assaults

Generally under District of Columbia law, employers are not held vicariously
liable for the sexual assaults of their employees. This conduct is considered, as a
matter of law, outside the scope of employment.5 In Boykin v. District of
Columbia,56 for example, the court of appeals found that a school coordinator who
sexually assaulted a female student who was blind, deaf, and mute, was acting
outside the scope of his employment. The coordinator, who himself was blind,
would occasionally go for walks with students. He sexually assaulted the plaintiff
on one such walk.5" The court stated "[t]he sexual assault ...arose out of Boyd's
assignment only in the sense that Boyd's walks with the student afforded him the
opportunity to pursue his personal adventure." 58 The Boykin court distinguished
Lyon v. Carey,"9 a rare case where an employer was held liable for a sexual assault
committed by an employee. In Lyon, a deliveryman beat and raped the customer
to whom he was making a delivery after a dispute arose over whether payment for
the mattress delivered was to be in cash or by check.60 The Boykin court cited
Lyon v. Carey:
The court noted that deliverymen endeavoring to serve their masters are likely
to come into conflict with customers. In this case, the court said, "The dispute
arose out of the very transaction which had brought [the deliveryman] to the
premises, and, according to the plaintiff's evidence, out of the employer's
'
instructions to get cash only before delivery."'
Because the sexual assault in Lyon v. Carey arose out of a dispute or "the
outgrowth of a job related controversy, '6 2 the court held the employee's acts
occurred within the scope of employment.
55. See Guzel v. State of Kuwait, 818 F. Supp. 6 (D.D.C. 1993) (federal district court, applying
District of Columbia law, stated "[s]exual assault is, by its nature, a crime committed for personal reasons"
which generally cannot be construed within the scope of employment). Id. at 10.
56. 484 A.2d 560 (D.C. 1984).
57. Id. at 561.
58. Id. at 563 (emphasis omitted).
59. 533 F.2d 649 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
60. Id. at 651.
61. Boykin, 484 A.2d at 563-64 (citing Lyon, 533 F.2d at 652).
62. Penn Central, 398 A.2d at 30.
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Although the District of Columbia Court of Appeals applies Section 228 in
determining whether conduct of an employee was in the scope of employment,0s
the court deviates from the factors set forth in the Restatement" when the
conduct at issue is a job-related dispute. The Restatement explicitly states that
conduct is within the scope of employment only if the conduct: is the type the
employee is hired to perform; transpires "substantially" within permitted time and
spacial limitations; is performed "at least in part" by a desire to "serve the
master"; and the force is reasonably expected by the master."" A servant is rarely
hired to engage in physical altercations with the customers. Most fights are
personal in nature, as every individual acts and reacts differently to provocation.
While it is difficult to argue that a fight initiated by an employee is intended to
serve the master, the District of Columbia courts have held that fights between
servants and customers are foreseeable.6 8 The court has not held, however, that
sexual assaults committed against patients like Ms. Sebastian are foreseeable, and
thus included within the scope of employment definition.0 7 The court of appeals is
correct in holding that fights which are the outgrowth of a job-related dispute are
within the scope of employment, even if the foreseeability of fights is at a similar
level as the foreseeability of sexual assaults. The court should abandon the
foreseeability standard, however, when determining whether sexual assaults are
within the scope of employment, and instead adopt a test where employers would
be automatically liable for the intentional tortious conduct of employees where
there is a special relationship of trust or dependency between the employee and the
victim. Foreseeability is an inappropriate standard because it is too amorphous; in
our society, fights and sexual assaults occur too frequently.
Because the District of Columbia courts have deviated from the Restatement

63. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
64. Id.
65. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 228 (1957).
66. See. e.g., Guzel v. State of Kuwait, 818 F. Supp. 6 (D.D.C. 1993) (applying District law in
determining scope of employment).
67. Sexual assaults may be especially prevalent in situations where the victim is unable to protect
herself because of age, or lack of mental or physical ability. In Doe v. Samaritan Counseling Ctr., 791 P.2d
344 (Alaska 1990), the Alaska Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial court, holding that the
defendant could be liable for the emotional distress suffered by a patient resulting from her sexual relations
with the defendant's employee-counselor. The court, citing Ira S. Bushey & Sons v. United States. 398 F.2d
167, 171-72 (2d Cir. 1968) (Friendly, J.). stated that foreseeability was used to determine uhcther the
employer should be vicariously liable for the employee's conduct because "while the sexual acts themselves are
purely self-serving, or caused by an unjustifiable loss of control by the aggressor, they have nonethcless been
precipitated by the employee's performance of [his] assigned duties." Samaritan, 791 P.2d at 348.
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§ 228 factors for job-related disputes, holding such disputes to be within the scope
of employment, the courts should also be willing to expand the test for other
intentional torts which are directly related to the employment, such as an
intentional tort resulting from a relationship of trust and dependency.
B.

Broadening the Scope of Employment Standard

One commentator, Rochelle Rubin Weber, proposes broadening the scope of
employment test to include sexual assaults not only where there is job-created
authority, such as with the police cases, but also "job-created access." ' 8 Ms.
Weber defines job-created access as "the power to gain access to the victim which
the employee would not have had in the absence of his position."8 9 Under this test
an employer is vicariously liable when the employee uses the access created by his
position to commit an assault which he would not otherwise be able to commit.
The job-created access test, however, is troublesome in its broadness. Different
types of employees can gain access to a large number of victims through the status
of their employment; should the employer be vicariously liable to such an extent?
In Lyon v. Carey,70 the deliveryman gained access to the apartment building
because he was making a delivery. If the deliveryman had raped another resident
of the building instead of the customer, his employer would have been liable under
Ms. Weber's test. Mr. Joy, as an ambulance attendant, would probably have
access to many of the patients at D.C. General Hospital. Should the District be
liable if Mr. Joy assaulted a woman who was hospitalized but not in his care?
Other District employees, such as building inspectors, meter readers, and repair
people, can gain access to potential victims solely because of their status as city
employees; to apply Ms. Weber's test would not only dramatically increase
liability, but it would also be a "major extension of current law," which the court

68.

See Weber, supra note 30.

69. Ms. Weber further states:
Requiring that the employee gain access in a way that the general public cannot ensures that the
employer is held liable for costs associated with its enterprise but not for all acts of its employees.
Thus, if the employee could have committed the sexual assault even if not employed, the assault
would be unrelated to employment and not within the "scope of employment." On the other hand, if
solely because of his job the employee gains access to an area from which the general public is
barred, and if he subsequently uses that access to commit a sexual assault, then his tortious conduct
is within the scope of his employment because he would not have been able to commit the act but for
his status as an employee.
Id. at 1539.
70.

533 F.2d 649 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
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1
in Sebastian refused to adopt.7

In Johnson v. Weinberg,72 the District of Columbia Court of Appeals adopted
the Restatement's definition of scope of employment." Johnson also relied on
Section 245 of the Restatement which states, "[a] master is subject to liability for

the intended tortious harm by a servant to the person or things of another by an
act done in connection with the servant's employment, although the act was

unauthorized, if the act was not unexpectable in view of the duties of the
servant."74 Therefore, under District law, an employer can be held liable for the
foreseeable intentional torts of employees, even if the employee was engaged in
conduct that the employer did not authorize.
Applying the standards set forth in Section 228, the court of appeals has held
that the question of scope of employment was an issue for the jury, and not the
court, in cases where a servant took part in a fight while on the job.78 In these

cases, the court found the fights to be an "outgrowth of a job related
controversy" 6 that reasonable jurors could find was within the scope of
employment. In the cases where the employee was on duty at the time the fight
occurred, the court of appeals found that it was "not unexpectable" (Le.,

foreseeable) 7 that a dispute could arise between the employee and the
78

customers.
The court of appeals distinguished the case of Penn Central Transportation Co.

v. Reddick" from other employee-fight cases. In this case, Penn Central's
employee was an off-duty railway worker who became involved in a physical fight

71. Sebastian, 636 A.2d at 966. The court said that such an extension is best left to the legislature Id.
72. 434 A.2d 404 (D.C. 1981). See also Smith v. Grimes. 798 F. Supp. 798. 800 (DD.C 1992)
(applying District of Columbia case law in analyzing scope of employment); Moseley v Second Nea St Paul
Baptist Church, 534 A.2d 346, 348 n.4 (D.C. 1987) (applying Restatement § 228)
73. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
74. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 245 (1957).
75. See Johnson v. Weinberg, 434 A.2d 404 (D.C. 1981) [hereinafter Johnson 11; see also Lyon v.
Carey, 533 F.2d 649 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Weinberg v. Johnson. 518 A.2d 985 (DC, 1986j [hereinafter Johnson
II]; Murphy v. Army Distaff Found., Inc.. 458 A.2d 61 (D.C. 1983); contra Penn Central Transp Co v,
Reddick, 398 A.2d 27 (D.C. 1979) (holding railway company not liable for fight betseen off-duty ratlay
worker and taxicab driver).
76. Johnson 1, 434 A.2d at 409 (quoting Lyon v. Carey, 533 F.2d 649, 651 (D.C Car 1976))
77. Courts use the "not unexpectable" language in § 228(1)(d) to mean "foreseeable-" See, eg .Guzel
State of Kuwait, 818 F. Supp. 6, 11 (D.D.C. 1993); Johnson I1. 518 A,2d at 991. Johnson 1. 434 A-2d at 403
78. Additionally, in the cases where the conduct of the employee was potentiall) %ithn the scop-e of
employment, the other factors of Restatement § 228 %ere substantially satisfied79. 398 A.2d 27 (D.C. 1979).
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with a cab driver over a dispute regarding a ride from the train station. 0 Because
the fight between the off-duty railway worker and the taxicab driver was personal
in nature and took place when the employee was no longer serving the interests of
the employer, this fight was not held to be within the railway worker's scope of
employment. 1
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals should expand the scope of
employment prong of master-servant vicarious liability to include not only
intentional torts committed as an outgrowth of a job-related controversy, but also
situations where an employee is charged with caring for a person who is vulnerable
and dependent on the employee. Because additional hazards exist with the
vulnerability of age, or physical or mental ability, employers who voluntarily
engage in businesses where employees work with children, the elderly, or the
mentally or physically ill, should be held strictly liable for intentional harm
committed by their employees. This proposition is much narrower than the jobcreated access standard proposed by Ms. Weber, and therefore would extend
liability, without being overly-broad.
In Moseley v. Second New St. Paul Baptist Church,82 the court of appeals
stated: "this court has consistently held that an employer can be deemed liable for
the torts of an employee if the latter's acts grew out of, or were generated by the
employment. 81 3 In the situations outlined in the remainder of this section, the
intentional torts described grow out of the relationship of trust created between the
victim and the aggressor/employee, thus falling within the Moseley standard.
1. The Provision of Health Care
In providing medical care, ambulance attendants may have to immobilize,
undress, and treat passengers. In the Sebastian case, Mr. Joy's job was to attend
to Ms. Sebastian as she was being transported to the hospital. He was required to
immobilize Ms. Sebastian, 84 and she was dependent on Mr. Joy to perform his job.
His tortious actions grew directly out of the duty he was required to perform for
his employment.

80. Id. at 29.
81. Id. at 32.
82. 534 A.2d 346 (D.C. 1987).
83. Id. at 348 (citing Johnson II, 518 A.2d at 988; Boykin, 484 A.2d at 562; Penn Central, 398 A.2d at
31-32; Meyers v. National Detective Agency, Inc., 281 A.2d 435, 437 (D.C. 1971)).
84. Ms. Sebastian suffered a back injury in the car accident which led to the ambulance being
summoned.
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Health care patients are said to have a special relationship with the hospital
which imposes on the hospital the duty to protect the patient from the foreseeable,
tortious acts of third persons.8 5 The foreseeability test should not be applied,
however, when the intentional tortfeasor is an employee entrusted with providing
medical care to the victim. The relationship of trust and dependency created
between the patient and the service provider merits strict liability.
Although courts have been reluctant to impose liability on health care facilities
in cases where a physician sexually assaults a patient, courts have found liability in
cases where a therapist or psychiatrist sexually assaults a patient." For example,
in Doe v. Samaritan Counseling Center,8" plaintiff sued the counseling center for
damages resulting from sexual relations initiated by her pastoral counselor at the
defendant Center." The Alaska Supreme Court found the potential for vicarious
liability in Samaritan by using the "motivation to serve" test for scope of

85. See, e.g., Bembenista v. United States, 866 F.2d 493 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts
Avenue Apt. Corp., 439 F.2d 477, 483 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (stating that hospital has a duty to "take reasonable
precautions to protect the [patient] from assaults by third parties which, at least, could reasonably have been
anticipated"); Hall v. Ford Enterprises, Ltd., 445 A.2d 610. 611 n.4 (D.C. 1982). Other jurisdictions have
looked to whether the doctor or health care provider was furthering his own interests, or the interests of the
employer. See Thompson v. Everett Clinic, 860 P.2d 1054. 1057-58 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that
although "a master cannot excuse himself when any 'authorized act was improperly or unlawfully performed.'
nor can he excuse himself when an unauthorized act is performed 'in conjunction with other acts which are
within the scope of duties the employee is entrusted to perform,'" the better rule is that a master is vicariously
liable when the servant is acting in furtherance of the business of the master, and not when the employee is
using the employment situation to take part in his own wrongful acts) (internal citations omitted). See also
G.L. v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 757 P.2d 1347, 1348-50 (Or. 1988) (The court refused to extend vicarious
liability law, based on a public policy rationale, to hold the employer strictly liable for the sexual assault
committed by an employee respiratory therapist on a patient. The court declined partly because it had not in
the past "embraced freewheeling judicial policy declarations in other cases.") (citation omitted).
86. See, e.g., Doe v. Samaritan Counseling Ctr., 791 P.2d 344 (Alaska 1990). The Samaritan court
cited Marston v. Minneapolis Clinic of Psychiatry and Neurology, 329 N.W.2d 306. 311 (Minn. 1983) and
Simmons v. United States, 805 F.2d 1363, 1371 (9th Cir. 1986) which also found respondeat superior liability
in therapist-patient sexual misconduct cases. Samaritan, 791 P.2d at 348 & n.5. Courts have based the
imposition of liability on the "transference phenomenon" which is"the term used by psychiatrists and
psychologists to denote a patient's emotional reaction to a therapist and is 'generally applied to the projection
of feelings, thoughts and wishes onto the analyst, who has come to represent some person from the patient's
past."

Simmons, 805 F.2d at 1364 (quoting ST.DU.N'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1473 (5th Lawyers' Ed.

1982)). See also Linda Mabus Jorgenson et al., Transference Liability. Employer Liability for Sexual
Misconduct by Therapists, 60 BROOK. L. REV. 1421 (1995); Cliona Mary Robb. Bad Samaritans Make
Dangerous Precedent: The Perils of Holding an Employer Liable for an Employee's Sexual Misconduct. 8
ALASKA L. REv. 181, 190 (1991).

87.
88.

791 P.2d 344 (Alaska 1990).
Id. at 345.
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employment.8 9 The Alaska court and other jurisdictions applying the test impose
liability when the employee's conduct arose out of a "motivation to serve the
employer." 90 The court analyzed the romantic relationship that arose between the
counselor and the plaintiff in light of the "transference phenomenon" 01 and
concluded "where tortious conduct arises out of and is reasonably incidental to the
employee's legitimate work activities, the 'motivation to serve' test will have been
satisfied." 9 2 The court also looked to subsection (2) of Section 228 of the
Restatement, which states in relevant part: "[c]onduct of a servant is not within
the scope of employment if it is different in kind from that authorized." 93 The
court reasoned that because an employee rarely has the authority to commit a tort,
the language of the Restatement should be construed "to mean only that the act
which leads to the tortious behavior cannot be different in kind from acts the
employee is authorized to perform in furtherance of the employer's enterprise."'
Courts should be willing to extend scope of employment when patients other
than psychiatric patients are assaulted by their health care providers. While the
therapist has, under the transference phenomenon, the authority in the mind of the
patient to "change and heal" 5 emotional ailments, the doctor has similar authority
in the mind of the patient to change and heal physical ailments. Both of these
situations lead to trust and dependency from the patient's point of view, and also
create vulnerability in the strong trust that exists.
Most people seeking treatment from physicians are vulnerable in a number of
ways. First, they have some type of health problem, which could range from a
minor discomfort to severe physical pain. Regardless, when visiting the doctor,
people are under the stress of some type of ailment and concern for their health.
Second, medicine is an elaborate science, and most people have only a rudimentary
understanding of it. Lay people, therefore, must rely on their doctor's expertise.
Finally, when visiting the doctor, the patient is required to disrobe and allow the
doctor to touch his or her body. This type of submission requires a great deal of
trust and belief that the doctor's intrusion is genuine and necessary for the

89. Id. at 347-48.
90. Id. The court applied the "motivation to serve" test in conjunction with Section 228 of the Second
Restatement of Agency.
91. See supra note 86.
92. Samaritan, 791 P.2d at 348.
93.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228(2) (1957).

94.
95.

Samaritan, 791 P.2d at 348 n.7.
Simmons, 805 F.2d at 1365.
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provision of care or diagnosis of medical problems." Any breach of this trust could
cause the patient severe mental anguish. Because of the lack of knowledge about
medical diagnosis and treatment, and the general concern, stress and anxiety
patients undergo, patients are required to give health care providers far greater
trust than they would give to other service providers. This high level of trust
between doctors and patients is essential for a productive physician-patient
relationship.
Based on the above, employers of medical care givers should be held strictly
liable for intentional harms committed by the medical care employees. The
expanded scope of employment standard in this type of situation would only
include intentional harm a care provider commits on a patient while providing, or
under the guise of providing, health care. This would include situations like Ms.
Sebastian's where the patient is immobilized and dependent on the ambulance
attendant who is required to care for the patient, yet intentionally harms her.
This expanded standard would not include cases where, for example, a patient in
a hospital is raped by a person not employed by the hospital; nor would it include a
rape by a hospital employee, such as a janitor or a cafeteria worker. In the
situation where an outsider came into the hospital, the employer should not be
vicariously liable because there is no type of relationship of trust between the
victim and the aggressor. The plaintiff in this situation would have to seek relief
from the hospital under an alternative theory, such as negligence for a breach of
duty in not protecting her from outside harm.97 Strict liability, however, would be
inappropriate. In the second situation where the non-health care provider rapes the
patient, strict liability would also be inappropriate; although the aggressor was a
hospital employee, there was no relationship of trust between the patient and that
employee, and no dependency resulting from a natural outgrowth of the trust."'
The actions of the cafeteria worker or janitor, as opposed to health care providers,
P. RICHARDS III & KATHARINE C. RATHBURN. bMD. LAW AND THE PHIYSCIAN A
113-27 (1993) (discussing special aspects of the physician-patient relationship).
97. See supra note 85.
98. The situation might be different if the aggressor was employed by the hospital as a security guard.
In this situation, liability for the hospital could be based on a contractual theory as discussed supra note 85.
But cf. Rabon v. Guardsmark, 571 F.2d 1277 (4th Cir. 1978). In this case, the court refused to hold a private
security agency liable for the sexual assault committed by the agency's guard on a woman working in a
building the guard was hired to protect. The court found that the sexual assault was not within the scope of
the guard's employment. The plaintiff argued that the private security agency should be categorized as a
common carrier. See supranote 12. The Fourth Circuit stated -we lack a reasoned basis on which to conclude
that the South Carolina Supreme Court would be persuaded to extend ...[the common carrier doctrine] to
private security agencies." Id. at 1281.
96.

See, e.g.,

PRACTICAL GUIDE

EDWARD
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would be outside the scope of employment standard-these employees are not in a
relationship where trust, dependency, and touching are required to care for
patients.
In addition, the expanded test would include only intentional harms committed
by the employee, not accidents, negligence, or harm occurring through the good
faith provision of medical care. Medical care involves risks; harmful results can
occur even with the best physicians using the most advanced forms of care. To
hold health care providers strictly liable for all harms would lead to physicians
refusing to treat patients, especially in risky situations. It would also lead to a rise
in medical malpractice insurance, resulting in a rise in the cost of medical care.
For accidental harm occurring during bona fide health care procedures, plaintiffs
would have to rely on theories of medical malpractice or negligence.
2.

Care of Children

The issue of employer vicarious liability for intentional torts committed on
children is being debated in California. 9 In the District of Columbia, the court of
appeals upheld jury instructions which stated that, where a school janitor rapes a
student at the school, the employer can be held vicariously liable only if the
"conduct of . . .[the employer] was a substantial factor in the assaults."100 The
court of appeals also has looked to the nature of the assault and its relation to the
employment.201 In some jurisdictions, courts look to the foreseeability of the act; 02
03
in other jurisdictions, courts examine its nature.

99. See supra notes 56-62 and accompanying text.
100. Lacy, 424 A.2d at 318.
101. Boykin, 484 A.2d at 562 (finding that sexual assault of student was not a "direct outgrowth" of

the school coordinator's employment).
102. See, e.g., P.L. v. Aubert, 527 N.W.2d 142, 146 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995). In determining whether
the school could be liable for the teacher's sexual misconduct with a 17 year-old student, the court looked to

"1whether the abuse is related to... [the teacher's] duties; and second, whether the abuse occurred within the
work related limits of time and place." Id. The court held that a reasonable jury could find that the teacher's
conduct was foreseeable and reversed the lower court's grant of summary judgment. Id. at 147.
103.

See, e.g., Bratton v. Calkins, 870 P.2d 981, 986 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994). The court looked to the

fact that the sexual relationship between the teacher and the student did not benefit the employer in any way,
and the mere fact that the teacher's employment provided him with the opportunity for the wrongful act was
not enough to impose vicarious liability on the teacher's employer. For support, the court cited the following
cases: John R. v. Oakland Unified Sch. Dist., 769 P.2d 948, 953 (Cal. 1989); Jeffrey E. v. Central Baptist
Church, 243 Cal. Rptr. 128 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (church not liable for sexual abuse of minor by Sunday

school teacher); Milla v. Tamayo, 232 Cal. Rptr. 685 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (archbishop not liable for sexual
relations between seven priests and minor parishioner); Alma W. v. Oakland Unified Sch. Dist., 176 Cal.
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Potential hazards exist when a professional caregiver cares for children. Parents
admonish children about the dangers of talking to strangers, but they emphasize
that children should trust a particular group of professional caregivers: teachers,
babysitters, counselors, day care providers and health care providers. In the mind
of the child, the parent's message creates an instantaneous special relationship
between the child and his or her caretaker. 1°4
When children are assaulted by a trusted service provider, the ramifications are
even more dramatic than when an adult is assaulted.'0 5 Because of their young age
and inexperience, children often do not understand what is happening to them."'
The assaulter takes advantage of the child's trust to get the child to do what he or

she wants. The assaulter may also intimidate the child by threatening punishment
or by threatening to report bad behavior to the child's parents.'07 By taking

advantage of the inexperience and the strong emotions of trust and fear of the
child, the aggressor severely violates the child emotionally and physically. The

results of such an incident usually have a tremendous impact on that child for the
rest of his or her life.' 08 Statistics point to incidents of assaulted children becoming
assaulters themselves, or experiencing severe emotional problems.'

Rptr. 287 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (school district not liable for sexual assault on student by janitor); Bo)kin v.
District of Columbia, 484 A.2d 560 (D.C. 1984); Bozarth v. Harper Creek Bd. of Educ.. 288 N.W.2d 424
(Mich. Ct. App. 1979); and Kimberly M. v. Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist., 263 Cal. Rptr. 612 (Cal. Ct
App. 1989).
104. This special relationship is further reenforced by the caretaker acting in loco parentis, defined as:
In place of a parent; instead of a parent; charged, factitiously, with a parent's rights, duties, and
responsibilities. [In] "[l]oco parentis" exists when a person undertakes care and control of another in
absence of such supervision by the latter's natural parents and in absence of formal legal approwoal.
and is temporary in character and is not likened to an adoption which is permanenL
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 787 (6th ed. 1990) (internal citations omitted).
105. Lucy Berliner, Nature and Dynamics of Child Sexual Abuse. in A JLDICIAL PRieRt O. CHILD
SEXUAL ABUSE 5-6 (Josephine Bulkley & Claire Sandt eds., 1994) (reporting effects of child sexual abuse to
include "post-traumatic stress disorder."). See also S.V. McLeer et al., Post-TraumaticStress Disorder In
Sexually Abused Children, 27 J. OF THE AM. ACAD. OF CHILD & AoLESCENr PSYCHIATRY. 650-54 (1988).
106. Because young children do not always understand the true nature of sexual assault, they do not
report the incident. Older children may not report sexual assault because they are afraid that they Mvillb
blamed for the incident, or because the aggressor has threatened to hurt the child if he or she tells someone.
See Berliner, supra note 105, at 3-4.
107. See Berliner, supra note 105, at 3-4.
108. See R.K. Hanson & S. Slater, Sexual ictimization History of ChildSexual Abusers: A Review,
in 1 ANNALS OF SEX RESEARCH 485-99 (1988).
109. See Hendrika B. Cantwell, M.D., Child Sexual Abuse: Very Young Perpetrators.In 12 CHILD
ABUSE AND NEGLECT 579-82 (1988). See also Berliner. supra note 105, at 6 (asserting a relationship exists in
adolescents between "sexual abuse and severe depression and suicidal behavior, substance abuse, running away
The
and self-destructive behavior" as well as psychiatric disorders in adults); K.A. Kendall-Tacket etal.,
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The expanded special relationship standard for strict liability will apply only to
situations where the child is entrusted to the care of the employee, such as
teachers, school administrators, camp counselors, babysitters, and day care
providers. Basically, the test would include those adults whom the child is told to
listen to, trust, and obey. It would not apply to a situation where a babysitter takes
a child to the supermarket and the child wanders off and is raped by an employee
of the store. In this situation, the trusted person (the babysitter) is not the
aggressor and the store employee is not charged with the care of the child. Had
the babysitter been the rapist, then the babysitter's employer (assuming arguendo
that the babysitter was employed by some type of service) would be strictly liable.
In this scenario, the plaintiffs would have to seek relief under a theory of
negligence, but would not have the advantage of strict liability.
3. Care of the Elderly and Incapacitated
Another class of particularly vulnerable plaintiffs who should be entitled to
special protection are the elderly and the mentally and physically incapacitated.
Many older people, as well as people with mental and physical disabilities, live in
institutionalized care. 10 They may make this choice voluntarily, or they may be
placed in care by their families, or committed by the courts."1 These residents are
forced to rely on the employees of the institution to help them with the basic daily
activities which they cannot perform themselves. Often, employees must feed,
clothe, and bathe the residents of these institutions, making the residents
particularly vulnerable to malicious attacks.' 12 Many of the people who have been
determined to be mentally incompetent do not have the capacities to realize they
have been harmed or to report the harm."' s Also, people with physical disabilities
Impact of Sexual Abuse on Children. A Review and Synthesis of Recent Empirical Studies, 113 PSYCHOL
BULL. 164-80 (1993).
110. See Toby S. Edelman, Nursing Facilities, in REPRESENTING OLDER PERSONS: AN ADVOCATES
MANUAL 69 (1990) (stating that in 1985, approximately 1.5 million people lived in nursing homes; of these,
88% were over age 65 (86% in 1977) and 40% were over 85 (35% in 1977)).
111. See JOHN J. REAGAN, THE AGED CLIENT AND THE LAW 121-22 (1990) (describing civil
commitment of elderly lacking capacity to care for themselves); Bruce S. Dix, Rights In Facilities, In
REPRESENTING PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES, 10-8 to 10-13 (Peter Danziger ed., 1991) (describing the legal
aspects of involuntary admission to mental health facilities).
112. See, e.g., Stropes v. Heritage House Childrens Ctr. of Shelbyville, Inc., 547 N.E.2d 244 (Ind.
1989) (resident with severe mental retardation and cerebral palsy raped by nurse's aide); Rodebush v.
Oklahoma Nursing Homes, Ltd., 867 P.2d 1241 (Okla. 1993) (elderly patient diagnosed with Alzheimer's
beaten by nursing home attendant).
113. See Maguire v. Montana, 835 P.2d 755 (Mont. 1992) (patient diagnosed with autism raped by
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may not have the power to forcibly protect themselves from aggression.
When an elderly person or persons with physical or developmental disabilities is

the victim of an intentional tort, the tests throughout the jurisdictions for scope of
employment are similar to the previous tests discussed. Some jurisdictions apply
the foreseeability test.11 4 Others, however, broaden the vicarious liability
protections by imposing common carrier type liability for institutions under the
theory that the institutions owe the patient a non-delegable duty of protective

care."1 5 This is an exception to the traditional theory of respondeat superior. 10
Employees in institutions and elder-care facilities should be strictly liable for the
intentional harms their employees commit against their patients. The elderly who
are institutionalized are dependent and reliant on the basic services that they are
unable to physically provide for themselves. They may also lack to varying degrees
the mental capacity to determine what their needs are.117 These factors make them
especially vulnerable and require them or their families to trust the employees of
the institution. 1 8 This vulnerability justifies the imposition of strict liability.
Persons with mental and physical disabilities who live in institutions are

aide, family found out when patient began to gain weight and was subsequently determined to be pregnant).
114. See. e.g., Gutierrez v. Thorne, 537 A.2d 527 (Conn. App. Ct. 1988).
115. The court in Stropes compared the nondelegable duty of protective care to the common carrier
doctrine:
[O]nce one has, by contract or otherwise, assumed the duty to protect another, the nature of that
duty may be such that the responsibility for providing the protection cannot be delegated cvcn
though the protective tasks themselves are.... [T]his non-delegable duty to protect is inherent in the
very nature of certain kinds of businesses. Second, where an employer has assumed a non-delegable
duty to protect a person and his employee inflicts injury on that person, the doctrine of respondent
superior will not interdict the imposition of liability on the employer even if the wrongful act was
outside the scope of employment.
Stropes, 547 N.E.2d at 250-51.
116. Stropes, 547 N.E.2d at 253. Cf. Maguire, 835 P.2d at 759-60 (declining to apply the nondelegable
duty exception in situations other than when the "subject matter is inherently dangerous") But see Justice
Trieweiler's dissent, calling the majority's opinion "tragic and misguided" and accusing the majority of
protecting the State rather than its citizens. Justice Trieweiler reasoned that the patient %%astotally dependent
on the care she received at the institution and that she and other "citizens have a right to place [trust] in the
public institutions that were created to protect society's most vulnerable people." Id.at 764.
117. See, e.g., J. BROOKE AKER ET AL. MENTAL CAPACITY MENTAL AND LEGAL ASPECTS OF TIlE
AGING 25-34 (1977) (describing aging and its effects on the brain); PETER J StU:SS ET AL AGING AND THE
LAW 9-11 (1990).
118. See Edelman supra note 110, at 78 (citing SuBcomt ON LONG-TERNI CARE. SENATE SPECIAL
COMM. ON AGING. NURSING HOME CARE IN THE UNITED STATES. FAILURE IN PU3uC POLICY
INTRODUCTORY REPORT, S. REP. No. 1420. 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1974); INSPECTOR GENERAL. RESIDENT
ABUSE IN NURSING HOMES: UNDERSTANDING AND PREVENTING ABUSE (1990). INSPECTOR GENERAL
RESIDENT ABUSE IN NURSING HOMES: RESOLVING PHYSICAL ABUSE COMPLAINTS (1990)
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similarly situated to the elderly. The unique circumstances of institutions makes
residents highly susceptible to harm. The institutions should be strictly liable for
their employees because of the particular vulnerability and needs of the patients
that place patients in a special situation of risk.
C. Justificationfor Expanding Liability in Sebastian
The special needs of patients like Ms. Sebastian justify imposing strict liability
on employers voluntarily entering into an arrangement to protect the safety of such
patients. Under the proposed standard, the District would be vicariously liable for
David Joy's intentional tort. Ms. Sebastian was an injured accident victim
dependent on an ambulance attendant charged with providing emergency medical
care as he rushed her to the hospital. Ms. Sebastian was immobilized on a
backboard so as not to sustain greater injury. Mr. Joy violated the trust Ms.
Sebastian had in receiving appropriate emergency care, and took advantage of her
vulnerability. Under the proposed standard, vicarious liability would be applicable
in this case.
Although imposing vicarious liability may not dramatically decrease the number
of intentional torts committed against these types of plaintiffs, it may encourage
employers to be more cautious in hiring, training and supervising employees. The
employer will use additional care in hiring, training and supervising employees to
the point where the marginal cost is equal to the marginal benefit received by the
employer. Therefore, even if the employer is strictly liable, the employer will not
over-invest in safety because the cost of compensating the victims for their injuries
will be less than the additional investment in safety. However, if a jury is
particularly impassioned by the rape of a child or an especially vulnerable adult,
the cost of satisfying large damage awards may be more than the employer could
possibly spend in providing the safest possible care for this special class of
plaintiffs.
Even if the threat of liability does not dramatically increase safety, it will at
least ensure compensation for victims who already had special needs that were
taken advantage of because of their need to rely on services.110 For example,
children and their families should be compensated for sexual assaults against the

119. Courts have cited compensation for victims as a reason for imposing vicarious liability. See, e.g..
Mary M. v. City of Los Angeles, 814 P.2d 1341, 1343 (Cal. 1991) (en banc) (citing Perez v. Van Groningen
& Sons, Inc., 719 P.2d 676, 678 (Cal. 1986); 5 HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF ToRTS § 26.5 at 21 (2d cd.
1986)).
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child. Such compensation could provide the means for physical and mental care
the child will need to assist with the problems they will experience as a result of
the intentional harm. Another rationale for imposing liability is "to ensure that the
victim's losses will be equitably borne by those who benefit from the enterprise
that gave rise to the injury."1210 For example, in Ms. Sebastian's case the burden of
compensating such victims will be borne by society, as a whole, as a cost of
maintaining an essential ambulance service that benefits everyone. An ambulance
service provides a public good of emergency medical care while transporting the
sick and injured to the hospital. Because society deems it necessary to have an
ambulance service, and benefits from it, society should also bear the cost of
liability when the service causes harm. "1 " Compensating victims intentionally
injured while reasonably relying on necessary medical services should be a cost of
providing such a service. Society also benefits from schools and day care centers.
Parents rely on these services so their children will be taken care of while the
parents work.

CONCLUSION

The District of Columbia courts should expand the scope of employment prong
of employer vicarious liability to include intentional harm committed by employees
who take advantage of a relationship of trust or dependency. By expanding scope
of employment liability to protect the needy and vulnerable in society, the court
would not too greatly expand current law, while ensuring compensation for the
victims. The scope of employment expansion would be invoked where a vulnerable
victim was in a relationship of trust or dependency with the employee. Such an
expansion would encourage the most reasonably efficient supervision, training and
hiring of employees by the employer. The needy and vulnerable potential plaintiffs
protected by the expansion would include children, patients seeking or submitting
to medical care, as well as the elderly and persons with physical or mental
disabilities who reside in institutions.

120. Mary M., 814 P.2d at 1343.
121. See. e.g.. Fruit v. Schreiner, 502 P.2d 133, 140-41 (Alaska 1972). (" Scope of emp!oyment" as a
test for application of respondeat superior would be insufficient if it failed to encompass the duty of every
enterprise to the social community which gives it life and contributes to its prosperity . . . The basis of
respondeat superior has been correctly stated as 'the desire to include in the costs of operation inevitable losses
to third persons incident to carrying on an enterprise, and thus distribute the burden among those benefited by
the enterprise.' ") (citation omitted).

